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want to begin by complimenting both
sets of authors on excellent pieces of
applied econometric research.
Particularly impressive are Anderson and
Rasche’s estimates of how changes in mini-
mum reserve requirements affect commer-
cial banks’ demand for reserves, a task
which required a careful analysis of a large
panel data set.  For their part, Dueker and
Serletis have performed a useful replica-
tion study, which provides valuable infor-
mation about  the sensitivity of some key
empirical results to changes in data con-
struction and sample period.
For the bulk of my comments, I will
reconsider the basic premise of this confer-
ence and ask whether the monetary base
(adjusted or not) is, or could become, a
good indicator of the stance of monetary
policy.  My belief is that it is not, and
(most likely) cannot be.   In giving my rea-
sons for this view I will interject some
comments bearing more speciﬁcally on the
two papers just presented.
There are really two questions about
the role of the base in monetary policy: a
short-run question and a long-run
question.  The short-run question is
whether high-frequency ﬂuctuations in the
base provide useful information about
changes in the stance of monetary policy.
The  long-run question is whether
targeting base growth is sufﬁcient to
ensure long-run stability of the growth
rates of prices and output.
HIGH-FREQUENCY 
FLUCTUATIONS
Are high-frequency ﬂuctuations useful
sources of information?  In general, the
usefulness of the base (or any other simple
measure) as an indicator of policy changes
depends on the central bank’s operating
procedures.  In virtually all industrialized
countries, over short- and medium-term
horizons the central bank implements
policy by targeting a short-term nominal
interest rate—the federal funds rate in the
United States. (In contrast, Switzerland is
the only country I know of with a system-
atic record of targeting the monetary base.)
In order to keep the interest rate at its target,
the central bank must accommodate ﬂuctu-
ations in the demand for reserves by
adjusting reserves, and hence the monetary
base.  Thus, any potential value that the
base  might otherwise have as a short-run
indicator of monetary stance is contam-
inated by its endogenous response to
changes in reserves demand.  Indeed,
demand effects probably dominate short-
term movements in the base, a conclusion
that is supported by the common ﬁnding
of the “liquidity puzzle”:  As Dueker and
Serletis show in their article, positive inno-
vations in the base (as well as in broader
monetary aggregates) are generally followed
by increases, rather than decreases, in short-
term interest rates.  This result, however, is
interpretable in the conventional framework
only if base ﬂuctuations reﬂect passive
accommodations of changes in money
demand rather than changes in policy.
Given the Fed’s operating procedures,
I would argue that the federal funds rate is
a much better (high-frequency) indicator
of monetary policy changes than is the
base, a view that would certainly be shared
by both Fed governors and the ﬁnancial
markets.  Indeed, in our recent work, Ilian
Mihov and I have used a structural vector
autoregressive (SVAR) methodology to
conﬁrm that funds-rate innovations are the
best simple measure of monetary policy
innovations during the past thirty years,
except during the 1979-82 Volcker experi-
ment (Bernanke and Mihov, 1995).
Dueker and Serletis’s replication of several
VAR studies yields ﬁndings generally con-
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couple of reservations about the funds-rate
indicator, however:  First, they ﬁnd that
the percentage of forecast error variance
(e.g., for output) explained by funds-rate
innovations differs over speciﬁcations.
Second, their results exhibit the “price
puzzle” of Sims (1992); analogous to the
liquidity puzzle mentioned above, the
price puzzle is the ﬁnding that positive
innovations to the funds rate (supposedly,
a tightening of monetary policy) are
followed by increases, rather than declines,
in the general price level.
Without entering deeply into the
issues associated with the SVAR
methodology, I would make just two sug-
gestions to Dueker and Serletis. First, I
think it is a mistake to put much weight
on the decomposition of forecast-error
variance when comparing candidate indi-
cators; I ﬁnd the impulse responses to be
much more informative.  There is no
reason why the share of the forecast that is
error explained by the optimal monetary
policy indicator should be large, or small,
or even constant over time; indeed, with
the ideal monetary policy, unanticipated
policy changes would contribute zero to
forecast-error variance. Second, some
allowance should be made for possible
structural breaks, particularly around the
regime switches in 1979 and the early
1980s (Dueker and Serletis never test for
or allow for these).  In our work, Mihov
and I found that when the sample is
broken up, and the appropriate monetary
policy indicator is associated with each
sub-sample, the implied impulse responses
are very reasonable.  In particular, there is
no evidence of a price puzzle.
TARGETED BASE GROWTH
What about the long-run issue of
whether a targeted rate of base growth is a
reasonable anchor for monetary policy?
Our economic intuition, which tells us
that the monetary base is a natural anchor,
is conditioned by the homogeneity results
of classical monetary theory:  All else
equal, a doubling of the monetary base
should double the price level.  But, unlike
the situation in comparative statics
exercises, all else is not equal when the
state of a dynamic economy is compared at
different points in time. In particular,
changes in technology, policy, and institu-
tions can—and typically do—lead to
unpredictable and long-lasting shifts in the
velocity of the base and other monetary
aggregates. Because a large component of
the base is currency, base velocity is also
potentially sensitive to phenomena like
currency substitution and ﬂuctuations in
foreign and domestic cash hoarding.  It is
well known that if base velocity contains a
unit root, then stabilizing base growth will
not lead necessarily to stable growth in
prices or nominal GDP . More subtly, we
know from rational- expectations analyses
of the interactions of monetary and ﬁscal
policy that ﬁxing the current rate of base
growth does not necessarily tie down even
the current rate of inﬂation; expectations of
future base growth, which depend among
other things on the government’s expected
budgetary position, are also relevant.
It should be emphasized that even if
one were willing to assume that base
demand is stationary (that is, assume that
base velocity does not contain a unit root),
that assumption would not be sufﬁcient to
make the base a good anchor for monetary
policy.  Stationarity of base demand does
not rule out either a high variance or
strong persistence of velocity shocks,
either of which would imply substantial
economic instability over medium-term
horizons. For a point of comparison, think
of the record of the gold standard:
Although this classical monetary regime
stabilized prices for a century in some
countries, it also permitted bouts of inﬂa-
tion or deﬂation (sometimes severe) over
lengthy periods.  Thus the theoretical and
empirical arguments for a stable
relationship between the prices of
consumer goods and gold bullion in the
very long run are not sufﬁcient to make
gold a good nominal anchor; similarly,
even if base velocity were shown to be ulti-
mately mean-reverting, large or persistent
deviations of velocity from its normal
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base-targeting procedure. (A small point in
favor of the new adjusted base can be
made here; Dueker and Serletis ﬁnd that,
post-1985, the forecast error for the
velocity of the current measure of the
adjusted base is about 15 percent greater
than that of the revised adjusted base.)
CONCLUSIONS
I would agree with most of the partic-
ipants at this conference that short-term
interest rates are not enough; monetary
policy needs a longer-term anchor. What
that anchor should be, however, is an
empirical question. Personally, my interest
has been piqued by recent experiments
with inﬂation targeting in many countries,
including Canada, New Zealand, the
United Kingdom, and Sweden. Although
this strategy has the important weakness
that inﬂation is not directly controllable by
the central bank, it also has several signiﬁ-
cant advantages: First, because inﬂation
control is the ultimate goal (and the only
feasible long-run goal) of monetary policy,
a central bank with inﬂation targets never
has to choose between achieving its
announced path for an intermediate
variable (like the base) and taking the
actions most likely to achieve its ultimate
target. For example, if velocity shocks
make the planned growth of a monetary
aggregate inconsistent with the inﬂation
goal, an inﬂation-targeting central bank
can make the necessary technical
adjustment in money growth without sac-
riﬁcing credibility with the public, the
legislature, or the markets.  Second, inﬂa-
tion targets allow the central bank to use
information from many sources
(including, for example, private-sector
forecasts) in making policy, rather than
being forced to rely on a single predictor
or indicator. Finally, inﬂation targets are
easily communicated to the public and are
probably the best means of increasing the
transparency and accountability of mone-
tary policy. I look forward to seeing the
results of the various inﬂation-targeting
experiments now under way.
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